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Many generalizations are impossible to learn via primary linguistic data, so 
they are assumed to be part of our genetic endowment. Generativists have 
tried to reduce Universal Grammar (UG) to a minimum, in particular by 
appealing to computational efficiency. In principle, this is an important 
improvement. The bottom line, however, is how well this computational 
approach explains the data. Unfortunately, it does not. Thus current 
analyses of subject–AUX inversion still appeal implicitly to several UG 
constraints in addition to structure dependence. Moreover, this fails 
empirically even in the wildest cases, such as forming questions by 
reversing the word order of a declarative. Fortunately, there is a way out of 
this impasse. Learners realize that different orders of constituents correlate 
with different meanings. Generating Tense in Comp compositionally derives 
a polar interrogative interpretation. The logically prior properties of the 
perceptual and conceptual systems impose constraints that are sufficient to 
explain language acquisition. 
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1. The Problem with Universal Grammar 
 
Language is a bidirectional link between sound and meaning. To explain how 
this system works, a first step is to describe as much of the facts as possible. The 
earliest efforts to address this problem typically involve a rich descriptive 
apparatus, which is gradually simplified by uncovering generalizations and 
explaining some of the facts by principles and laws recruited from other domains 
with which language interacts. The properties of the language that learners attain 
are determined by three factors (Chomsky 2005): Genetic endowment (the topic 
of Universal Grammar), personal experience, and principles that are language- or 
even organism-independent.  
 Some facts are particularly problematic for the descriptive apparatus. 
Chomsky replaced the question of what takes place in languages by the question 
of what takes place in speakers. In this biolinguistic perspective, the problem of 
acquisition becomes crucial: Once we have proposed a model of linguistic 
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competence, we have to provide a convincing scenario about the way children 
come to master a system as complex as language so quickly and uniformly. For 
some 50 years in the generative framework, the answer was assumed to be in 
Universal Grammar (UG).1 Many of the generalizations expressed by generative 
principles seem to be impossible to learn on the basis of primary linguistic data 
because it would require negative data. So children seem to know more about 
language than what they could learn from their experience. This is the argument 
of poverty of stimulus (POS). Generativists conclude that UG restricts the 
acquisition path. Children do not have to learn these principles since they are 
part of their genetic endowment, and they cannot err outside of the path traced 
by these principles: They only choose among the options provided by UG those 
which conform with their experience.2  
 However, this enrichment of UG creates a tension with the explanatory 
value of the model. UG contains the unexplained elements of S0: “UG is the 
residue when third factor effects are abstracted. The richer the residue, the harder 
it will be to account for the evolution of UG, evidently” (Chomsky 2007a: 19).3 In 
contrast, operations and principles recruited by the faculty of language from 
other cognitive domains have a greater explanatory potential. Therefore: 
 
A primary goal of linguistic theory since has been to try to reduce UG 
assumptions to a minimum, both for standard reasons of seeking deeper 
explanations, and also in the hope that a serious approach to language 
evolution, that is, evolution of UG, might someday be possible. There have 
been two approaches to this problem: one seeks to reduce or totally 
eliminate UG by reliance on other cognitive processes.   (Chomsky 2011: 263) 
 
Adherents to this approach often base their explanations on the communication 
function of language and the social context of normal use of expressions. Many 
rely on the statistical analysis of massive collections of utterances. They often 
                                                
    1 See, for instance, Chomsky (1973: 232): “[T]he fundamental empirical problem of linguistics 
is to explain how a person can acquire knowledge of language […]. To approach the 
fundamental empirical problem, we attempt to restrict the class of potential languages by 
setting various conditions on the form and function of grammars; the term ‘universal 
grammar’ has commonly been used to refer to the system of general constraints of this sort”. 
    2 For a comprehensive presentation of the argumentation that UG constraints canalize 
acquisition, see Crain (1991). Crain & Pietroski (2006: 64) still adhere to the view that a UG 
component plays a prominent role in language acquisition: “[H]uman languages are trans-
formational, and subject to constraints that (at least apparently) do not reflect basic 
principles of logic or communication or learnability […]. The findings […] reveal young 
children’s staunch adherence to the universal and unifying principles discovered by 
linguists working in the generative enterprise”. 
    3 Chomsky (2010a) mentions his attempts to generalize rules and constraints as examples of 
this goal (see also Boeckx & Hornstein 2009). But generalizations do not imply that the rules 
or constraints should be dispensed with, only that their essence is better captured in these 
broader forms. Moreover, a minimal descriptive apparatus does not necessarily reduce the 
explanatory burden: A single highly implausible element on evolutionary grounds can raise 
severe problems of explanation. Also, we must evaluate the system as a whole, to insure 
that the generalization really reduces apparently different phenomena to the same 
operation, and does not require that we state the distinctions elsewhere in the system. For 
instance, the Move ‘generalization’ necessitates countless uninterpretable features that are 
construction (and even utterance) specific, so this system may be less general overall than a 
standard phrase structure system. 
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attempt to account for linear sequences of words and neglect properties such as 
ambiguities and non ambiguities due to the hierarchical organization of 
sentences. Chomsky has a harsh evaluation of this approach: “It has achieved 
almost no results, though a weaker variant — the study of interactions between 
UG principles and statistical-based learning-theoretical approaches — has some 
achievements to its credit” (Chomsky 2011: 263). A similar judgment holds for 
alternatives that propose to account for the acquisition of instances of POS by 
claiming that the learning capacity is better than asserted, or that the available 
data is richer (Berwick et al. 2011, Chomsky 2011). 
 The second approach to the UG problem is to try to reduce it by invoking 
more general principles. Chomsky assumes that these language-independent 
principles fall into two categories. First, there are interface conditions that the 
expressions generated by a language must satisfy because they are imposed on 
language by the systems with which it interacts. Second, assuming that language 
is a computational system, it is subject to ‘natural laws’ of computation, such as 
principles of efficient computation. 
 
We can regard an explanation of properties of language as principled insofar 
as it can be reduced to properties of the interface systems and general 
considerations of computational efficiency and the like.   (Chomsky 2005: 10) 
 
He underlines the fact that these language-independent principles derive from a 
very general initial condition whose importance has been recognized since the 
origins of evolutionary biology: Natural selection necessarily operates within the 
options of form and development allowed by the laws of nature. “A very strong 
proposal, called ‘the strong minimalist thesis’, is that all phenomena of language 
have a principled account in this sense, that language is a perfect solution to 
interface conditions, the conditions it must satisfy to some extent if it is to be 
usable at all” (Chomsky 2007a: 20). In principle, this is an important improve-
ment over a theory based on a UG store of constraints since it crucially relies on 
externally motivated properties, as argued extensively in Bouchard (2002). 
 In generative grammar, the emphasis is on computational tools: Interface 
conditions play a rather secondary role and function as external filters that the 
computations must satisfy. Consequently, the computational system for human 
language (CHL) is the main explanatory tool and little appeal is made to precise 
interface properties to explain precise linguistic properties. Very telling in this 
regard is the fact that when Chomsky (2005: 10) discusses these two types of 
language-independent principles, he provides several references to papers on 
efficient computation, but not one to studies on interface systems. The key 
explanatory concept is computational efficiency. 
 The bottom line however is how well this computational approach explains 
the data. Unfortunately, it does not fare well: it ends up requiring much more UG 
enrichment than is explicitly recognized, and it is also empirically inadequate 
because the system as a whole does not capture the facts about the acquisition of 
language. A clear illustration of this state of affairs can be found in the discussion 
of a stellar case of Poverty of the Stimulus — structure dependence. Despite 50 
years of revisions of the initial characterization, the posited UG is not better 
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grounded, it requires the addition of several auxiliary hypotheses, and even then 
it does not actually handle the original examples, or the extended set of 
examples, and fails empirically even in the wildest cases. So in effect, it has 
achieved almost no results. Fortunately, there is a way out of this impasse. But 
first, let’s see the nature of the problem. 
 
 
2. Structure Dependence and UG 
 
The formal precision of generative grammar has helped uncover many proper-
ties, but as I will now show, the engineering model actually gets in the way of 
figuring out what is going on, and why things are as they are. A good example is 
the decades of discussions surrounding what takes place in polar interrogatives 
like (1b). 
 
(1) a. The man is happy. 
 b. Is the man __ happy? 
 
This kind of construction raises a key question: Why does the tensed verb appear 
in a particular position? From the earliest studies (Chomsky 1968, 1971: 25–28), 
this subject–AUX inversion has been used to argue that rules are structure 
dependent, and it is still discussed regularly today in essentially the same form as 
over four decades ago (Crain 1991, Pinker 1994, Bolender et al. 2008, Berwick & 
Chomsky 2008, Chomsky 2010a, 2010b, 2011, and Berwick et al. 2011, among 
many more). Structure dependence is important in generative argumentation for 
reasons that go far beyond the desire to find the precise description of question 
formation. The significance of this constraint lies in the assumption that it is 
innate, a language-specific property, because “the sample data for selecting a 
correct target hypothesis does not seem rich enough without positing a priori the 
principle in question” (Berwick & Chomsky 2008).  
 Chomsky has repeatedly argued that the corpora children have access to 
are unlikely to contain evidence that syntactic transformations are dependent on 
constituent structure, not on linear structure. For instance, Berwick & Chomsky 
(2008: 383) ask us to consider learners exposed to the pair of sentences in (1). 
 
We then ask how a child might […] choose between two competing rules for 
question formation, each rule operating via the ‘displacement’ of the 
auxiliary verb is to the front of the representation: rule (A), which is not 
structure-dependent but refers only to words and ignores phrase structure; 
and rule (B), which is structure-dependent and refers to phrase structure 
[…]. 
 
(A)  Front the first occurrence of is. 
(B)   Front the structurally most prominent occurrence of is. 
 
[…] Application of (A) leads to the correct result when applied to examples 
such as [(1)], but does not generalize correctly to [(2)], whereas (B) works 
properly on [(2)]. Children and adult grammars select (B), indicating that 
structure dependence is part of the a priori schematism. 
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(2) a. The man who is tall is happy. 
 b. Is the man who is tall __ happy? [from rule (B)] 
 c.      * Is the man who __ tall is happy? [from rule (A)] 
 
Their point is that, if children could access all possible types of formal systems to 
make hypotheses about what is going on in (1b), they could make several simple 
structure-independent hypotheses, such as (A). There are many other possibili-
ties, such as those in (3) — if we make the “reasonable” assumption that children 
encounter declarative sentences like (1a) first, as Crain (1991: 602) puts it.4 
 
(3) a. Move an occurrence of is to the front of the sentence. 
 b. Move the last occurrence of is to the front of the sentence. 
 
These two hypotheses derive the correct order (2b), but (3a) also derives the 
incorrect order (2c), and (3b) produces the incorrect order (4b) from (4a). 
 
(4) a. The man is happy because it is sunny. 
 b. *Is the man is happy because it __ sunny. 
 
Yet children do not make errors like these, even though the data of experience are 
too poor to select the correct hypothesis. The standard account is that humans 
have an innate principle of “structure dependence of grammatical rules generally, 
including rules of question formation” (Berwick & Chomsky 2008: 383). 
 Chomsky (2010a, 2011) tries to go further and to provide a more principled 
explanation of these facts. He addresses two questions not previously raised in 
the traditional literature on structure dependence. First, why is there structural 
instead of linear locality in grammar? 
 
Suppose it can be shown that linearization is never required for 
interpretation at CI (conceptual-intentional). Then we would expect it to be 
introduced solely as a reflex of SM (sensory-motor), where it is plainly 
needed. That would carry us a step farther towards answering the How and 
Why questions that remain for Aux-inversion: minimal structural distance 
(structure-dependence) is the only option (given the third factor consider-
ation MC, Minimal Computation): linear order is simply not available to the 
computational system at the point where the C-inflection relation is 
established.              (Chomsky 2011: 274) 
 
 However, some facts are problematic for the general assumption that 
linearization is not relevant in semantic interpretation. For instance, Wasow 
(1979: 36) proposes the Novelty Condition — that an anaphorically dependent 
element cannot have more determinate reference than its antecedent — in order 
to account for the facts in (5): 
 
(5) a. A doctori walked into the room. The mani at first said nothing. 
 b.      * A mani walked into the room. The doctori at first said nothing. 
 
                                                
    4 This assumption should be checked carefully, as children are very frequently exposed to 
interrogatives. 
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True, linear order comes from the sensorimotor system: “[T]he structure of our 
sensorimotor system is such that we can’t speak in parallel. We just speak 
linearly” (Chomsky 2010a: 10).5 But this linearity is internalized in our brain: 
Production and perception of the linear arrangement of elements is not purely 
physical. Linearity must be internalized, otherwise words/signs as we know 
them would be impossible. A word/sign is a link between a concept and a per-
ceptual form, a signifié and a signifiant in Saussure’s terms. Without a perceptual 
form associated with it, a concept is just a concept: it only becomes a meaning — 
a linguistic element — when it is linked with a perceptual form. So a word is de-
fined in part by its phonological substance, including the order of its phonemes. 
The internal representation of these phonemes and their ordering is a crucial 
distinguishing feature of a word. Consequently, some internal linear properties 
of words are available all along derivations, including when the computational 
system merges two lexical items A and B in syntax: Since each word has 
indications on how to linearize its phonemes in the motor system, the linearized 
phonemes of A will necessarily have to be linearized with respect to those of B. In 
the case at hand, it is most likely that some aspects of order of the Tensed verb 
are available to the computational system at the point where it processes Tense.6 
So the question why there is structural instead of linear locality is not answered. 
 The second question that Chomsky raises is why it is the Tense of the main 
clause that moves to C, and not some other element, such as the head of the NP 
subject, for instance. Assuming that structural locality is relevant, the answer 
must be that T is structurally the closest node to C. However, the subject in Spec 
of T is at least as close to C as T. Chomsky obtains the effect that T is nevertheless 
closer to C by assuming that the subject is not there when T and C are related. 
Though the subject obligatorily surfaces in Spec of T, it is initially generated 
internally to VP and is raised later. This appears to be counter-cyclic, but is 
solved by assuming that CP is a phase but not TP; so the raising of the subject out 
of VP to T is in the same phase as the movement of T to C: The subject will not be 
in the way if it moves out of VP only after T has moved to C. 
 If we try to replicate the experiment, i.e. the derivation, we realize that 
there are several implicit assumptions in this analysis for which there are no 
evident principled explanations. Thus, the following stipulations are required: 
 
i. Something must move in C when a sentence is a polar interrogative. 
ii. T moves to C before the subject NP moves to the T position. 
iii. CP is a phase but not TP, i.e. in any movement analysis, minimal distance 
involves specifying what counts as a barrier node. 
iv. Though the verbal phrase sister of T is as close to C as T is, T is the target of 
movement. (See Chomsky (2007b: 16): Why does the full v*P never raise?) 
                                                
    5 This, of course, is Saussure’s (1916) Principe de Linéarité. 
    6 Assuming that the system can somehow temporarily “forget about” phonemes and linearity 
creates a severe problem. The system must be able to retrieve this material later in the 
derivation to provide a complete surface string for a sentence. It is rather unclear what it 
means for features to be in limbo for part of the derivation, and how this really restricts the 
functioning of the system, since the features are nevertheless kept in this obscure storage 
facility. Actually, adding a novel storage facility to the system makes it more complicated. 
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 As things stand, these stipulations have no discernible principled explan-
ation and have the status of UG statements. Some of these stipulations are de-
pendent on the particular analysis that Chomsky (2010a, 2010b) proposes, and 
they can be seen as fairly innocuous details to be worked out in his newly pro-
posed analysis. But there are four more constraints that have been implicit in all 
arguments for structure dependence. 
 
 Constraint (i): The rule targets the Tense of the sentence. 
 
The target is Tense, not the word is, nor AUX. Thus, when there are two auxiliary 
verbs as in (6a), tensed AUX is fronted as in (6b), not the other AUX. 
 
(6) a. John has been reading. 
 b. Has John been reading? 
 c.      * Been John has reading? 
 
Moreover, when there is no AUX as in (7), do-support isolates Tense from the 
verb and only Tense is fronted. 
 
(7) a. John ate the apple. 
 b. Did John eat the apple? 
 c.      * Ate John the apple? 
 
Without constraint (i), the learner could erroneously assume that you move some 
element to form a question, any element at all. 
 
(8) a. The man is happy today. 
 b.      * Today the man is happy? 
 c.      * Man the is happy today? 
  d.     * Happy the man is today? 
 
 Constraint (ii): The Tensed element ends up in a particular position, outside 
the basic sentence (i.e. TP). 
 
Without constraint (ii), the child could make the error of moving Tense to any 
other positions in the structure. This can be attributed to the presence of a Q-
marker on Comp (Baker 1970) that attracts Tense to check it, but that bluntly 
restates the facts and does not explain why anything at all must be in that 
position in polar interrogatives. As Chomsky (1995) remarks generally, this kind 
of formulation, “is a restatement of the basic property, not a true explanation” (p. 
233) and “the sole function of these feature checkers is to force movement” (p. 
278). Stating that the movement is due to the requirement of checking the Q-
feature pushes the stipulation deeper in the system but does not dispose of it. 
 
 Constraint (iii): The phenomenon is restricted to main clauses. 
 
Without (iii), the embedded Tense could be targeted and fronted to the embed-
ded Comp (9b), or to the main clause Comp (9c). 
 
D. Bouchard 
 
 
8 
(9) a. Mary said the man is happy. 
 b.      * Mary said is the man __ happy?  [not direct discourse] 
 c.      * Is Mary said the man __ happy? 
 
There is another constraint that is implicit in the discussion: This change in word 
order produces a sentence with a different meaning. 
 
 Constraint (iv): The special word order correlates with a question meaning. 
 
Without (iv), the child could just “play” with the rule, with no change in meaning 
as in (8). 
 Chomsky (2010a, 2010b) tries to explain away Constraint (i) by having T in 
the most prominent structural position in the sentence. However, this is obtained 
at the cost of adding stipulations (i) to (iv) to the theory, so on the whole there is 
no clear progress here. As for Constraints (ii), (iii) and (iv), he implicitly assumes 
them like everyone else. Therefore, in this analysis, we have no answer to the 
basic question: Why does the tensed verb appear in a particular position? 
 These appeals to UG preclude the analysis from providing a principled 
explanation of the facts. The four constraints above and structure dependence are 
roughly of the same degree of complexity as what they are supposed to account 
for: They restate in technical terms what the facts are. However, we are not told 
why these particular facts hold: Why is Tense involved in question formation? 
Why is it only the Tense of the main clause? Why does having Tense in Comp 
correlate with a meaning of polar interrogative? We are just told that these facts 
correlate with random system-internal features and constraints. The constraints 
have to be stipulated, listed in UG, because they follow from nothing. Science is 
not merely interested in what is, in inventories of facts and assertions of existence 
(regardless of how crafty the formulations may be); science is mostly interested in 
why things are as they are, in modalities of what is possible. It may be that these 
“system-internal constraints […] are efficacious in forestalling wrong turns a 
child might otherwise take” (Crain 1991: 602), but they are quite inefficient in 
elaborating an explanatory scientific theory, precisely because they are system-
internal and have no independent, external motivation. 
 
 
3. Structure Dependence and the Facts 
 
3.1. Constraints on How, but Not on What Can Be Attained 
 
Not only is structure dependence conceptually weak, it also fails empirically to 
explain even the wildest cases. For instance, no human language forms questions 
by linearly reversing the word order of a declarative. Though this is usually 
presented as a far-fetched possibility, it is actually feasible if the only condition is 
structure dependence. Consider how Cinque (1994, 2010) derives the mirror 
order of adjectives in French vase chinois bleu from the structure reflected in the 
English order blue Chinese vase. 
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(10) a. basic structure in order predicted by LCA: bleu chinois vase  
 b. movement of N:          bleu vase chinois  
 c. remnant movement of N+ADJ:     vase chinois bleu 
 
First, the N is raised as in (10b). Then a phrase WP that contains vase chinois is 
moved above bleu to the Spec of some category Z that has an uF that happens to 
attract phrases like WP. With tools like these, it is possible to save the LCA 
whenever it does not directly predict the correct scope of Adjs (see an extensive 
discussion of what this analysis implies in Bouchard 2002, 2011). By 
appropriately setting the features, tools like move and remnant move can just as 
easily have structure-dependent derivations for questions that reverse the word 
order of a declarative. The derivation can even be better motivated than in the 
case of adjectives. For instance, consider the assumption that an interrogative 
sentence like (1b) has a Q-marker in Comp that attracts the tensed verb. In 
addition, the sentence has a specific interrogative intonation. Kegl et al. (1996) 
assume that this intonation is anchored in the Comp with a Q-marker and it 
spreads over the structure (but see Bouchard 1996). Since the Q-marker in Comp 
can trigger the movement of a Q-feature checker (Tense) and the specific 
intonation, a child can make the “natural” analogy that the Q-features that 
spread on every constituent, phrasal or terminal, can each trigger movement.7 So 
in (11), the Q-marked money locally adjoins to the local DP to check its feature 
with the Q-feature of the: this eliminates the Q-features of money and the, but 
leaves the feature of the DP untouched; the Q-marked DP then locally adjoins to 
the VP to check its feature with the Q-feature of took; finally, the Q-marked VP 
locally adjoins to the DP to check its feature with the Q-feature of John.8 
 
(11) John took the money   
 John took money the  
 John money the took  
 money the took John  
 
Of course, the derivation could be made much more complex under other 
assumptions. Details like these aside, the main point is that, even with structure-
dependence and constraints (i) to (iv), the analytical tools that we commonly find 
in various analyses of other data allow us to derive constructions that are 
impossible in any language. Structure dependence restricts how the child can 
invert the order of words, i.e. it proscribes doing it by applying a linear rule, but 
it does not prevent the child from inverting the order as in (11). So structure 
                                                
    7 Sportiche (1995) assumes that the Q-marker that triggers the rising intonation in the French 
intonational questions (i) also triggers a movement, i.e. the raising of the whole IP to the 
Spec of the Q-morpheme. 
 
 (i) Tu aimes ce livre?               French 
  ‘You like that book?’ 
 
    8 There are abundant examples of this kind of derivation with remnant movement in the 
Cartography project, some with even more complexity. See for instance the analyses of 
adverbs in Cinque (1999) and of DP and IP in Cinque (2002), the derivation of possessive 
constructions in Kayne (2006) and of-phrases in Kayne (2002). 
D. Bouchard 
 
 
10 
dependence fails empirically. In fact, just about anything is possible under those 
assumptions. For instance, suppose that the direct object is fronted instead of 
Tense in polar interrogatives in a language: This would ‘demonstrate’ that con-
straint (i) is parameterized between Tense and direct object, i.e. languages choose 
which of the two is a Q-feature checker (or alternatively the direct object ends up 
closer to Comp in that language because it is forced to check some agreement 
features early). If Tense moved to a position other than COMP, you only have to 
change the list of landing sites: The Q-marker would also appear in another 
position (or Tense nevertheless moves to Comp but covertly). If Tense moved out 
of embedded clauses in some language as in (9c), escape hatches could easily be 
provided, as in the many cases where movement theory assumes movements out 
of complement clauses, i.e. wh-movement, subject raising, long head movement 
in some Balkan languages (Rivero 1994 and references therein). We could also 
appeal to Relativized Minimality (Rizzi 1990): If we discovered a case of a polar 
interrogative with AUX Inversion in an embedded clause, this would ‘demon-
strate’ that only the embedded Tense has the crucial Q-feature. Berwick et al. 
(2011: 1230) strongly criticize Perfors et al. (2011) because they do not “explain 
why Is the boy who lost left fails to have the following interpretation: (is it the case 
that) the boy who is lost left?”. But Berwick et al. fare no better in their account of 
this fact, if you look at the whole system. The subject being higher than Tense in 
the structure, the system can determine that the Tensed AUX inside the relative 
clause of the subject is the closest Tense to Comp, assuming that all the other 
elements in the subject are irrelevant under Relativized Minimality. The reason 
why that sentence does not get this erroneous interpretation in their system is 
due to assumptions like the subject is not yet high in the structure when T moves 
to Comp. This is an ad hoc ordering of the Subject Raising transformation after 
the Tense Raising transformation: there is no other reason to assume this 
ordering but the end result. Compare this with the free ordering of the raising of 
two quantifiers (May 1985): Assuming that the subject must raise and Tense must 
raise, both in the same phase, the two orderings of rules should be equally pos-
sible, and is only ruled out by blunt stipulation. 
 All of this and much more is possible in the movement analysis because 
these constraints are random facts, which therefore could be replaced by other 
random constraints in UG. Given current assumptions in minimalism, the 
grammars produced from these tools overgenerate radically. 
 
3.2. Crosslinguistic Variation in Question Formation 
 
Contingent constraints also fail to provide an informative account of cross-
linguistic variation in question formation. Some languages indicate that a sen-
tence has a question interpretation by means other than a special order. For 
instance, Québec French and Korean express the illocutionary force of inter-
rogation not by putting Tense in a special position but by marking the Tense of 
main clauses with a Q-particle, –tu and –ni, respectively.9 
                                                
    9 An interrogative particle is found in several varieties of French, varying in form between –tu 
and –ti. It historically comes from a reanalysis of the sequence t-il in questions like (i): 
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(12) a. Paul a-tu  fini?            Québec French 
  Paul has-QP finished 
  ‘Has Paul finished?’ 
 b. Je fais-tu ça  correctement? 
  I do-QP  this correctly 
  ‘Am I doing this correctly?’ 
 
(13) Chelswu-ka mues-ul  po-ass.         Korean 
 Chelswu.NOM INDEF.ACC see.PAST 
 ‘Chelswu saw something.’ 
 
(14) Chelswu-ka mues-ul  po-ass-ni.        Korean 
 Chelswu.NOM INDEF.ACC see.PAST.QP 
 i.  ‘What did Chelswu see?’ 
 ii. ‘Did Chelswu see something?’ 
 
The sequence in (14) is interpreted either as a yes/no question or as a question 
bearing on mues-ul. The two interpretations correspond to different intonations: 
The intonation peak is on the subject or the verb under the yes/no question inter-
pretation, whereas an intonation peak on mues-ul results in a questioned-phrase 
interpretation (Cheng & Rooryck 2000). So instead of the positional strategy used 
by English to provide a signifiant for the illocutionary force of polar interroga-
tive, Korean uses the morphological marking ni, and yet another signifiant — 
intonation — to distinguish between the existential and interrogative interpre-
tation of mues. The option of intonation that our physiology provides as a signifi-
ant is also used in French, as in (15), where a particular rising intonation suffices 
to express the illocutionary force of interrogation:10 
 
(15) Jean a  acheté un  livre?          French 
 Jean has bought a  book 
 ‘Has Jean bought a book?’ 
 
Particle marking and Q-intonation show that Tense is not targeted for either 
linear or hierarchical proximity to Comp: Tense is targeted because of its 
                                                                                                                                 
 (i)  Pierre mange-t-il?             French 
   Pierre eat.3.SG -he 
   ‘Does Pierre eat?’ or ‘Is Pierre eating?’ 
 
    10 The fact that a rising intonation encodes interrogative force may be related to the fact that in 
many languages, an intonational rise signifies incompleteness, whereas an intonational fall 
indicates completeness (Vaissière 1995, Bouchard 2002: 375–376). For instance, when a 
speaker enumerates the items of a list, a rising intonation on an item (represented as <) 
indicates that the enumeration is not completed, whereas a falling intonation on the last 
item signals completeness.  
 
 (i) a. Il y avait Paul<, son frère<, ses soeurs<, et sa mère. 
  b. There was Paul<, his brother<, his sisters<, and his mother. 
 
 This may explain why an intonational rise is frequently used to signal polar interrogatives: 
It indicates that the discourse is not completed, hence it is a request to complete the infor-
mation. 
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meaning. Of course, it is always possible to add elements to the theory to main-
tain that Tense is targeted for its hierarchical proximity to Comp. One could pro-
pose that the Q-intonation is anchored in the Comp with a Q-marker and spreads 
over the structure, as Kegl et al. (1996) assume, and assert that the interrogative 
particles –ni and –tu (and for good measure, the Q-intonation), trigger the move-
ment of Tense to the Comp with a Q-marker, but covertly in these cases. One 
could then claim that this Q-marker captures a generalization about the role of 
Comp in all polar interrogatives. However, this is a false generalization: In so do-
ing, we are not capturing a generalization but creating it, at a cost. This is similar 
to a putative universal that Morris Halle used to discuss in his classes: Every 
word of every language ends with the phoneme /a/. This universal is validated 
by the fact that many words do end in /a/. What about all those words that do 
not? With a twinkle in his eye, Morris would say that this demonstrates that there 
is a rule (or several) that deletes the /a/ (or prevents it from being pronounced) 
under certain conditions. Our job as linguists is to figure out what those con-
ditions are. Of course, Morris was just illustrating how easy it is to create false 
generalizations, with auxiliary hypotheses to save the day. Note that his false 
generalization is better substantiated than the one about the Q-marker in Comp: 
Every language has at least a few words that end in /a/, whereas most (if not all) 
languages fail to show a surface, pronounced Q-marker in Comp. 
 There is another way in which languages vary in question formation: 
Languages do not target Tense in the same way. In English, only AUX (be, have, 
modals) or dummy do are targeted, whereas in French, in addition to AUX (être, 
avoir), lexical verbs can also be involved in various complex ways. 
 
(16) a. L’enfant aimait ce jouet.          French 
   ‘The child liked that toy.’ 
 b. L’enfant  aimait-il  ce  jouet?  Pronoun copy 
   the child  like-he  that toy 
   ‘Did the child like that toy?’ 
 
(17) a. Il aimait ce jouet.             French 
   ‘He liked that toy.’ 
 b. Aimait-il ce  jouet?  Pronoun-verb inversion 
   liked-he  that toy 
   ‘Did he like that toy?’ 
 
This difference between the two languages comes from the way the grammar of a 
language can deal with a syntactic head that has multiple functional specifi-
cations marked by its morphology. For instance, how can a Verb+Tense word 
such as liked or aimait function? There are two logical possibilities. First, they may 
function as a unit, so whatever is under the scope of T or V is also under the 
scope of the other, and whatever has scope over T or V also has scope over the 
other. Second, they may function independently from one another: Something 
under the scope of the head may be under the scope of T or V without being un-
der the scope of the other, and something with scope over the complex head may 
have scope over T or V without having scope over the other. 
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 English functions as in the first case, so do-support is required to separate 
the main verb from Tense when only Tense is targeted as in polar interrogatives. 
French exhibits the second possibility. We see this in portmanteau words such as 
du ‘of.MASC.SING.DEF’, des ‘of.PLUR.DEF’, au ‘to.MASC.SING.DEF’ and aux ‘to. 
PLUR.DEF’: These words have features of both a preposition and a determiner, 
and the sets of features appear to interact with other constituents independently 
from one another. Thus, in aux enfants ‘to the children’, aux expresses both the 
features of a preposition (à) that has a DP argument and the features of the Det 
(definite plural). This portmanteau effect in French, and its absence in English, 
explains why Tense is not targeted in the same way in these two languages. For 
instance, if not must have scope only on the verbal (predicative) part of the sen-
tence and not on Tense, this explains the presence of does in (18), which removes 
Tense from the scope of the negation. 
 
(18) Mary did not eat peanuts. 
 
(19) Marie ne  mangeait pas d’arachides.     French 
 Marie  NEG eat.PAST  not of peanuts 
 ‘Marie did not eat peanuts.’ 
 
 In French, pas is the negative element and the particle ne indicates the scope 
of the negation. So negation has scope over mangeait, but the portmanteau effect 
allows negation to scope over the verbal part mang- without scoping over the 
Tense part –eait. The same effect is found in the polar interrogative in (17): The 
whole form aimait is generated in Comp, but only the Tense part –ait is relevant 
for the polar interrogative interpretation. The equivalent sentence in English is 
‘Did he like that toy?’ and it requires do-support. See Bouchard (1995: sect. 5.4) for a 
detailed account of variations like these. In particular, whereas adverb placement 
is just a correlation with ad hoc features in the movement analysis (Emonds 1978, 
Pollock 1989, Piattelli-Palmarini & Uriagereka 2004), in the portmanteau analysis, 
it follows from the necessity to choose how to analyze V+T, a parameter that de-
rives from the junction point between syntax and morphology. 
 
 
4. UG Meets Semantics 
 
Insofar as a model based on structure dependence is intended to cover such cases 
and explain such facts as those presented in the previous section, and it fails to 
accommodate them, and so do approaches based on claims of a better learning 
capacity or richer data, this indicates that a feature common to all these models is 
seriously amiss. These approaches are all based on the generativist description of 
what is going on: they assume that the generalizations and ‘laws of grammar’ 
that generativists discovered are roughly empirically correct. But facts, i.e. obser-
vational propositions, are part of a theory, they are not external to it and inde-
pendent (Lakatos 1970): Their status can be questioned in the face of an over-
whelming problem. A residue of unexplained elements that will not go away for 
50 years is indicative of a serious problem. It may well be that what generativists 
claim that children know requires several domain-specific devices like those 
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listed in UG, but that is irrelevant because that this is not what children know, as 
I will now argue for subject–AUX inversion (For reasons of space, I cannot look at 
more cases here, but see references at the end of the conclusion). Under the view 
that Tense moves when there is subject–AUX inversion, the two options of 
particle marking and Q-intonation, as well as the four constraints (i) to (iv) and 
structure dependence, are accidental properties: They do not seem to be deriv-
able one from another and each requires a stipulation. This weakness comes from 
the fact that this view neglects an important aspect of what is learned: The 
semantics of the construction, the fact that each order in (1) correlates with a dif-
ferent meaning. If children are only exposed to the difference in linear order in 
(1a–b), it may be that they do not have access to data rich enough for some 
inferential techniques to determine what is going on in their language. But by the 
context of use, they are also exposed to the difference in meaning between these 
two sentences.11 Crucially, bringing in the semantics of the sentences changes the 
picture of what is going on to a point where the syntax of (1a–b) is not at all as 
represented in the transformational analysis: The movement analysis gets in the 
way of figuring out what children learn. “Chomsky’s arguments, and mathema-
tical evidence of unlearnability of syntax, made fundamental assumptions about 
what is learned that merit closer scrutiny. In particular, they assumed that syntax 
is independent from meaning, and that the task for the learner is to identify rules 
that generate legitimate strings of syntactic elements and that do not generate 
illegitimate strings” (Bishop 2009: 188). But children do not learn those kinds of 
rules, they do not learn that transformations apply under particular constraints in 
constructions like (1a–b): They learn that a different order comes with a different 
meaning (see Matthews 1993: 211–214 on the unjustified conflation of generative 
grammars with what a child allegedly knows). 
 Let’s look at the facts in a more theory-neutral way. What do learners 
‘realize’ in comparing (1a–b)? That the Tensed auxiliary is can appear in two dif-
ferent positions, and the meanings of the two resulting sentences are different. Is 
this a reason to postulate a transformational rule? In English, a difference in word 
order usually correlates with a difference in meaning. In generative grammar, it 
is assumed that there are two kinds of these correlations between positions and 
meanings, and they have two different syntactic derivations. First, a movement 
analysis is proposed when an element appears ‘displaced’ from where it is 
interpreted, as in (20), where the sentence-initial wh-phrase is interpreted as the 
direct object of kiss. 
 
                                                
    11 Slobin (1975: 30) offers an important reminder on the matter:  
 
 Most studies of child language comprehension put the child into a situation where 
there are no contextual cues to the meaning of utterances, but in real life, there is little 
reason for a preschool child to rely heavily on syntactic factors to determine the basic 
propositional and referential meaning of sentences which he hears. Judith Johnston and 
I have gone through transcripts of adult speech to children between the ages of two and 
five, in Turkish and English, looking for sentences which could be open to misinterpre-
tation if the child lacked basic syntactic knowledge, such as the roles of word order and 
inflections. We found almost no instances of an adult utterance which could possibly be 
misinterpreted. That is, the overwhelming majority of utterances were clearly interpret-
able in context, requiring only knowledge of word meanings between actors, actions, 
and objects in the world. 
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(20) Who did John kiss? 
 
 The second type of correlation between positions and meanings is the one 
that speakers learn when they are exposed to pairs as in (21). 
 
(21) a. John saw Mary. 
 b. Mary saw John. 
 
The correlation in (21) is systematic: If John is in position A, it is interpreted as the 
one who sees; if John is in position B, it is interpreted as the seen one.12 The 
question is whether Tense in the question (1b) is interpreted in the same way (in 
the same position) as it is interpreted in the declarative (1a), hence a case of 
movement as in (20), or the pair in (1) is an instance of an element appearing in a 
different position with a different interpretation as in (21). In order to determine 
this, we must figure out how Tense contributes to the meaning of the sentences in 
(1a) and in (1b).  
 We can describe the meaning and form alternations in (1) in terms of the 
notion of ISSUE. Ladusaw (1996), following ideas of Frege and Davidson, 
proposes that the main predication expressed by a sentence is a description of a 
class of events and this description is the ISSUE about which we must make a 
judgment. In an affirmative declarative sentence like (1a), the speaker expresses a 
positive judgment by placing the syntactic counterpart of the ISSUE under the 
immediate scope of the deictic Tense, i.e. the Tense of the main clause that is 
determined with respect to the moment of speech, with respect to ‘reality’ 
(Bouchard 1998, 2002). It is a typical property of (main) sentences that they are 
obligatorily tied to our indexical system of immediate experience by means of a 
deictic element. This deictic anchoring is presumably required to establish the 
truth conditions of the sentence. Though Tense is by far the most frequent deictic 
anchor, some languages anchor their sentences with deictic Location or Person 
instead (Ritter & Wiltschko 2009).13 Because this deictic element relates to the 
event of the whole sentence, it is a prominent element in the set of combinatorial 
relations of the sentence: That is why scholars who represent these relations in 
terms of hierarchical structure intuitively put this deictic anchor at the head of 
the sentence, with the syntactic counterpart of the ISSUE — the VP — as a 
complement of Tense. As is well known, one of the arguments — the subject — is 
external to the VP. This comes from the fact that the relation between the deictic 
anchor and the ISSUE is forced to be less direct than a simple combination of 
Tense and the VP. As indicated in Bouchard (1995: 168), an event is a relationship 
between various actants, whereas Tense identifies a point in time. Event and 
point in time cannot be directly related because they are ontologically different: 
                                                
    12 The idea that the order of two constituents is a possible signifiant seems to have been part of 
Saussure´s thinking, though he never developed it in any detail. For instance, in Bouquet & 
Endler (2002: 48), Saussure alludes to a sign that consists in placing a certain sign before a 
certain other. 
    13 Young English speaking children often use verbs without Tense in simple clauses, in vio-
lation of the adult grammar of their language. This is most likely because their utterances 
are not detached from the immediate environment in the early stages of language acquisi-
tion, so they are ostensibly linked to it without recourse to a deictic element. 
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One is a point, the other a network of points. The relation is therefore established 
between the point in time and one of the points of the event, one of its actants, 
the subject. The subject is this privileged actant from whose perspective the event 
is related to time, as determined by lexical specifications of the verb. By situating 
the subject with respect to the temporal point, the network of relations that the 
subject entertains with the other actants — the ISSUE — is also situated. This 
explains the two particular relations that Tense establishes in a sentence. On the 
one hand, Tense appears in a close combination with the predicative part: Either 
it combines syntactically with the VP or morphologically with its head. On the 
other hand, the result of this first combination in turn combines with the subject 
(in hierarchical terms, the subject is the specifier of that constituent).  
 This analysis provides a principled explanation to the special status of the 
subject argument (instead of listing the peculiar property as a special feature like 
EPP), because it is based on an externally motivated factor (what Chomsky 2005 
refers to as a ‘third factor’). The notion of principled explanation is important on 
general grounds. As Lakatos (1970) remarks, some scientific propositions are con-
sidered to be external because they are logically prior to the object of study, since 
this object presupposes them. In linguistics, the most basic observational propo-
sition given the status of initial condition is that language is a system that links 
concepts and percepts. Therefore, language is determined by the subsystems that 
govern these elements, namely the conceptual system found in human brains, 
and the sensorimotor systems of human bodies. Since the properties of these 
subsystems are presupposed by the definition of the object of study of linguistics, 
the linguistic community deems them to be self-evident, determined by logically 
prior sciences. Thus, the sciences that account for acoustics, the physics of 
articulation, the cognitive aspects of how humans conceptualize the world, and 
so on, are given an observational status. For instance, Tesnière (1959) (following 
Saussure 1916), Kayne (1994), Bouchard (2002) argue that some phrasal structural 
properties can be derived from the observational proposition that words must be 
ordered in oral languages because our articulatory system does not allow the 
production of two words simultaneously. The explanation for this linearization 
does not lie in linguistic theory, but rather in whichever science accounts for 
properties of the articulatory apparatus of human beings that produces the 
sounds of language. In analyzing a language with a different modality such as a 
sign language, it is therefore crucial to take into account the differences in linea-
rity/simultaneity, among others, as argued forcefully in Bouchard & Dubuisson 
(1995) and Bouchard (1996). Properties of the conceptual and perceptual sub-
stances provide a strong basis of explanation because it is possible to relate the 
explanandum to an explanans that is independently motivated since it comes 
from domains that are logically prior to language.14  
                                                
    14 In the Minimalist Program, minimal computation is by far the ‘third factor’ that is most 
typically called on. However, efficient computation may be the least sound basis for 
explanation. At the formal level of the elaboration of a theory, it is efficacious to have a 
theory that satisfies conditions of simplicity and non-redundancy. But maximal efficiency 
does not appear to be adequate to explain natural phenomena (Johnson & Lappin 1999). In 
biological systems, efficiency is typically a mix of economy and redundancy to insure 
robustness. Language also is typically replete with redundancies. For instance, the fact that 
the expression is feminine is indicated three times in (i.a); the fact that the subject is first 
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 In contrast with a declarative sentence, in an interrogative like (1b), the 
deictic Tense is expressed outside of the extended syntactic counterpart of the 
ISSUE, i.e. the VP plus the subject. In hierarchical terms, Tense is in the position 
where we find complementizers. Evidence for the Comp position comes from the 
fact that the sentence-initial placement of the tensed verb is not compatible with 
the presence of a complementizer. For instance, French has two types of exclama-
tives, one with inversion (22a) and one with a complementizer (22b); however, 
the two never co-occur (22c) (Goldsmith 1981). 
 
(22) a. Est-elle belle! 
 b. Qu’elle est belle! 
 c.      * Qu’est-elle belle! 
 
 In languages that allow ‘doubly filled Comp’ such as Québec French, wh-
interrogatives can involve inversion of the tensed verb as in (23a) or filling the 
position with complementizer que as in (23b); however, it is not possible to have 
both the tensed verb and que preceding the subject as in (23c-d).  
 
(23) a. À qui as-tu parlé?           Québec French 
  ‘To whom have you spoken?’ 
 b. À qui que tu as parlé? 
  ‘To whom that you have spoken?’ 
 c.      * À qui qu’as-tu parlé? 
  ‘To whom that have you spoken?’ 
 d.     * À qui as que tu parlé? 
  ‘To whom have that you spoken?’ 
 
 The fact that Tense is in Comp in interrogatives means that it holds a 
different relation with the ISSUE, and this affects the interpretation. In Bouchard 
(1998, 2002), I suggest that with Tense outside (in COMP), the ISSUE is presented 
as being separated from Tense, as not being established. This induces a polar 
interrogative interpretation, a request to know whether the ISSUE should be 
considered established or not. Under this view, Tense is not moved to COMP. 
Instead, Tense is generated as combining externally, with the whole sentence, in 
contrast with the two internal relations with the VP and the subject that occur in 
affirmative clauses. 
 This external combination is possible because [Tense + ISSUE] is an inter-
                                                                                                                                 
person plural is marked twice in (i.b); the interrogative meaning is expressed by both a 
particular word order and a particular intonation in (i.c). 
 
 (i) a. La   petite  chatte. 
   the.FEM  small.FEM cat.FEM 
  b. Nous   marchons 
   Pronoun.1.PL walk.1.PL 
  c. Are you coming?  
 
  To reconcile linguistic theory with the potential biological messiness of language, it is 
more fruitful to appeal to the other components of the third factor, namely the design pro-
perties of the conceptual and perceptual properties of signs.  
D. Bouchard 
 
 
18 
pretable syntactic combination, whereas [Tense + N], or [Tense + Det], etc. are 
possible syntactic combinations, but they are not interpretable (no more than V as 
Spec of N etc.), so these combinations do not occur. There isn’t a rule of question 
formation, and the notion of construction has no status in the theory: There is a 
combination Tense + ISSUE which results in polar interrogative interpretation. 
There isn’t a movement involved in (1b) because Tense entertains a single 
relation with the ISSUE, different from the ones in the declarative (1a). What is 
going on is not fronting as in rules (A) or (B) of Berwick & Chomsky (2008), but 
rather rule (C). 
 
(C) Merge deictic Tense from outside with the whole ISSUE (VP plus subject). 
 
 Tense is generated there directly, it does not move from another position, no 
more than John or Mary in (21). As expected, other deictic anchors function like 
deictic Tense in questions. Thus Ritter & Wiltschko (2009) observes that in yes/no 
questions in Halkomelem, the locative AUX li appears in Comp. Here too 
presenting the ISSUE as not deictically established results in a polar interrogative 
interpretation. 
 In short, Merge applies freely, and declaratives and interrogatives involve 
two ways of merging Tense that result in structures that are interpretable. A 
system with free Merge permits radical overgeneration, but in general this is not 
a problem since the ungrammatical combinations are filtered by selection 
restrictions, as indicated in Bouchard (1979, 1982, 1984, 1991). This is a principled 
explanation since it is a foundational notion that words and constituents have 
meanings, and a selection restriction results from the compatibility of these prim-
itive properties. Grimshaw (1979) and Pesetsky (1982) were among the first gen-
erativists to argue that the semantic primitives are epistemologically prior to the 
primitives of c-selection.15 However, some matters remain unclear concerning 
Tense. There is a restriction on what Tense can merge with (at least in English 
and French): The element must morphosyntactically be verbal. Though event 
DPs and small clauses may also be construed as descriptions of events, they do 
not make good interrogatives, as a reviewer pointed out (24). Of course, they also 
do not make good declaratives (25). 
 
(24) a.      * Did [ the emperor’s death ]? 
 b.      * Did [ the emperor dead ]? 
 
(25) a.      * The emperor’s did death. 
 b.      * The emperor did dead. 
                                                
    15 There are also many attempts to constrain free Merge syntactically, but they are descriptive, 
not explanatory. For instance, Svenonius (1994), Holmberg (2000), Adger (2003), Di Sciullo & 
Isac (2008), assume that lexical items have categorical features that must be checked against 
the categorical feature of selected objects, and that this checking is a defining condition on 
the application of Merge. This added mechanism is costly and purely descriptive. As Koster 
(2009: 8) remarks, this is no progress from Chomsky (1965), since Merge essentially funct-
ions like a Phrase Structure rule: Lexical items have features that say what kind of element 
they take as a sister. Moreover, c-selection features do not extend straightforwardly to the 
merger of adjuncts, since an adjunct is not selected by a lexical item.  
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So some finer distinction must be made between the ISSUE of a VP and the 
semantics of event DPs and small clauses that will explain why only the former is 
compatible with the semantics of Tense. For now, I do not know what that differ-
ence is, so I will leave it as a descriptive restriction in wait of a principled account. 
 We now see why all the properties described in the constraints above are 
interrelated in questions. (i) Tense is involved because of its relation with the 
ISSUE. (ii) Tense is in Comp because in that position it establishes a particular 
semantic relation with the ISSUE. (iii) The Tense of the main clause is involved 
because the ISSUE is a matter of the utterance, of the main predication of the 
whole sentence.16 (iv) The interpretation results in a polar interrogative meaning 
because the combination [Tense + ISSUE] presents the ISSUE as not being estab-
lished. Together these properties have the effect that, in a displacement analysis, 
the movement of Tense appears structure dependent. But this is an illusion. 
Question formation is not structure dependent, it is meaning dependent. 
 What learners realize when exposed to (1a–b) is that if Tense is in a 
sentence-internal position, it is interpreted as establishing the ISSUE with respect 
to deictic time, and if Tense is in a position external to the ISSUE, it is interpreted 
as not establishing the ISSUE. Learners expect these kinds of correlations be-
cause, given Saussurean arbitrariness, they are conservative about order and do 
not mess with it in order not to lose the systematicity of what it conveys: As with 
signs in general, a difference in form is expected to correspond to a difference in 
meaning, and vice-versa. They will normally need rich, positive evidence before 
they use a different word order, such as a meaning difference, just as they learn 
other position-meaning correlations with the phonemes of lexical signs, and the 
order of arguments like John and Mary in (21), of pre- and post-nominal adjec-
tives in French, and countless other examples.17 
 As expected, the juxtaposition of the Tense-bearing head with the whole 
ISSUE-constituent (VP plus subject) is not the only possible signifiant to express 
this particular relation between Tense and the ISSUE: Some languages use other 
signifiants, such as marking Tense with a dedicated particle, or superimposing a 
particular intonation on the whole projection of Tense, as we saw in (12) to (15).18 
                                                
    16 According to Henry (1995), inversion is also possible in embedded interrogatives in Belfast 
English, as in (i):   
 (i) She wonders had she picked the dish.  
 This may be due to a Celtic influence. It would be interesting to look into the Tense system 
of Belfast English to see if the embedded Tenses can be deictic, directly tied to the moment 
of speech, instead of indirectly through a concordance with the Tense of the main clause. 
    17 Given conservatism (a well-motivated principle on evolutionary grounds), Schoenemann 
(2005: 65) argues that   
 positive evidence can actually be used as a weak form of negative evidence (i.e. “if this 
form is correct, then another is unlikely to be correct, barring future positive evidence 
to the contrary”). Chomsky (1981) has pointed out that if children notice that “…certain 
structures or rules fail to be exemplified in relatively simple expressions, where they 
would be expected to be found, then a (possibly marked) option is selected excluding 
them in the grammar, so that a kind of ‘negative evidence’ can be available even 
without corrections, adverse reactions, etc.” (p. 9). Regier (1996) showed that this can be 
implemented for learning word meanings as well.  
    18 Hurford (2011: 278–279) also proposes a semantic approach to structure dependence in 
Subject–AUX inversion, but it differs significantly from the one proposed here. The key for 
him is that  
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5. Empirical Arguments to Move Tense? 
 
It could be argued that we must assume that Tense moved in (1b) because the 
Tensed verb in Comp exhibits displacement properties with respect to selection 
and agreement. For instance, the modal can is semantically associated with eat in 
(26a), not with fly. 
 
(26) a. Can eagles that fly eat? 
 b. Can [[eagles that [v* [fly]] [v [eat]]]? 
 
 Chomsky (2011) and Berwick et al. (2011) follow the generative tradition 
and assume that when words separated in a string exhibit semantic/phrasal 
relations that are prototypically exhibited by adjacent words, there is a step in the 
derivation where the ‘displaced’ constituent is in that position. So there is a step 
in the derivation of (26) where can is in the position represented by v. Originally, 
Chomsky (1957) observed some systematic similarities between sentences such as 
declarative-interrogative pairs, active-passive pairs and declarative-wh-question 
pairs, and he argued that these regularities were difficult to capture with phrase 
structure rules. He suggested that the similarities were due to a common under-
lying structure, to which each of the sentences was transformationally related. 
“The general problem of analyzing the process of ‘understanding’ is thus 
reduced, in a sense, to the problem of explaining how kernel sentences are under-
stood, these being considered the basic ‘content elements’ from which the usual, 
more complex sentences of real life are formed by transformational develop-
ment” (Chomsky 1957: 92).19 
                                                                                                                                 
 children surely must be [concerned] with making communicative utterances. When a 
child asks a question, she usually has a referent in mind that she is interested in finding 
out about. That’s why she asks the question. Is Daddy home yet? is a question about 
Daddy. The natural thing for a child learning how to ask questions in English is to 
realize that you put an expression for the person or thing you are asking about just 
after the appropriate auxiliary at the start of the sentence.       (Hurford 2011: 278) 
 
 This casual impression is the basis for his meaning-based rule:  
 
  Meaning-based: To ask a question about something, signal the questioning intent with 
an appropriate auxiliary, then use an expression for the thing you are asking about. 
(This expression may or may not contain another auxiliary, but that doesn’t distract 
you.)                    (Hurford 2011: 279) 
 
 Hurford’s approach to semantics is highly referential and often reduces meaning to causal 
relations between words and objects. He talks about “a connection between hierarchical 
syntactic structure and the structure of the situations or events one is talking about” (p. 279).  
  On the empirical side, the proposal is almost vacuous. It accounts for none of the 
properties (i) to (iv) discussed above. It just stipulates that (i) Tense (‘auxiliary’) is involved, 
and says nothing about (ii) the Comp hierarchical position Tense occupies in questions. 
Concerning the fact that (iii) Tense must be from the main clause, the rule makes the vague 
stipulation that it involves the ‘appropriate auxiliary’, with a parenthesis to specifically 
exclude an auxiliary internal to the expression targeted by the question. However, this does 
not exclude all the other embedded auxiliaries as in (4b), (6c) or (9b). The fact that (iv) this 
construction correlates with a polar interrogative meaning is a total accident in this account. 
There is also no account of the fact that the ‘targeted expression’ happens to be the subject of 
the sentence (including ‘expletive’ there and it). 
    19 This relation to simpler, more natural constructions to express quasi-logical properties is 
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 Some linguists may feel that some positions, some syntactic relations, are 
natural, and that they tacitly interpret some elements in those positions. From the 
casual observation that, in some languages, some semantic relations between 
items are expressed by having these items occupy certain positions in a sentence, 
it is an easy step to assume that the mapping of semantic representations onto 
morphosyntax should be universally positional, i.e. that this is the ‘conceptually 
natural’ syntactic relation. But this idea faces the problem of accounting for all 
the cases in which languages use other means than linear juxtaposition to express 
relations, such as intonation, case marking, the use of loci in sign languages, etc. 
These conflicting facts force the adoption of a more complex model of grammar. 
For instance, case-marked elements typically have a relatively free ordering. This 
forces the adoption of costly constructs, such as assuming that Case-marked 
elements have a scrambling feature that induces pied-piping even after Case 
assignment, with the pied-piped element ‘attracted’ by a higher probe (Chomsky 
2000). So Case-marking languages mysteriously happen to have extra mechan-
isms that conspire to give the impression of a freer order.20 The positional view 
implicit in movement theory requires a stipulation barring these other coding 
possibilities from relating directly to semantics, and further stipulation of the 
additional mechanisms (such as the various kinds of features that trigger move), 
therefore facing a considerable empirical burden.  
 Returning to (26), can does not have to be in a lower position next to eat in 
order to bear on eat rather than fly. Consider a possible (simplified) structure for 
(26a): 
 
(27)    TenseP    4 
 Tense    Vn+1       g      4 
   can    NP     Vn        %      g 
          eagles that fly    eat 
 
Since the modal is the sister of the verbal projection of eat, a simple rule of 
interpretation will have it apply to eat and not to fly.21 
 Another argument to assume that Tense moved in (1b) is based on the fact 
                                                                                                                                 
assumed to be part of a more general behavioral strategy: A “hierarchical organization of 
behavior to meet some new situation may be constructed by transforming an organization 
previously developed in some familiar situation” (Miller & Chomsky 1963: 485). 
    20 Proponents of Lexical Functional Grammar and Relational Grammar observed that this kind 
of approach does not provide a natural account of free order. Culicover & Jackendoff (2005: 
190) remark that this theory “misses the traditional insight that linear order, case-marking, 
and agreement are independent grammatical devices that each can be used to link phono-
logical structure to meaning; none of them is dependent on the others, but in some lang-
uages they may co-occur redundantly”. 
    21 As shown in Bouchard (1984, 2002), this kind of analysis can be extended to long-distance 
dependencies as in wh-questions without the need of special rules of movement or devices 
such as the metavariables (⇑ and ⇓) of Lexical Functional Grammar (Kaplan & Bresnan 1982) 
or SLASH propagation as in Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (Gazdar 1982, Gazdar 
et al. 1985). 
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that the Tensed verb agrees with the subject as if this verb and the subject were in 
the same relation as in (1a). Hence, for a sentence like (28), Chomsky (2011: 272) 
assumes that there are heads “in the positions of the inflectional elements” and 
Berwick et al (2011: 1214) “indicate the actual position of interpretation with dv, 
and the logically coherent but incorrect position by dv*”. 
 
(28) [do [eagles that dv* fly] dv eat]  
 
 However, this positional view of agreement is not a fact. It presumes the 
result it aims for, namely that this agreement is dependent on a particular struc-
tural relation between the subject and Tense, and that this relation only holds in a 
structure corresponding to the declarative sentence. But the assumption that 
agreement depends on a structural relation faces empirical problems when there 
is agreement between a pronoun and its antecedent as in (29a), and even more 
when there are multiple antecedents as in (29b), or it occurs across sentences as in 
(29c), or in contexts of pragmatic anaphora as in (29d): 
 
(29) a. Johni showed Mary a picture of hisi/*heri uncle. 
 b. Johni spoke to Maryj in the presence of Billk and theyi,j,k all agreed to 
 leave. 
 c. Johni came in. Hei looked very happy. 
 d. A pointing to B who is trying to catch up with a woman who is 
 skating very fast:  
   “You’ll never be able to catch up with her.” 
 
 To maintain that agreement in general depends on a particular kind of 
structural relation (like Spec–Head, for instance), very unlikely structures and 
operations will have to be postulated to account for these examples. Or else two 
theories of agreement will be required: a structure-based theory for subject–tense 
agreement, and another one for cases as in (28). However, a unified account of all 
types of agreement is possible, without excessive structural material: This is the 
approach to agreement proposed in Bouchard (1984, 1987, 1995: 225–226). Under 
this view, agreement is a consequence of interpretation, as expressed in (30) (see 
also Baker & Brame 1972, Jackendoff 1972, Fauconnier 1974, Lapointe 1980, Hoek-
sema 1983, Chierchia 1987, Pollard & Sag 1992).22 
 
(30) Coherence Condition on Coindexation 
 Coindexed elements must be interpreted coherently. 
 
The condition states that there can be no clash in the features of coindexed ele-
ments: Either the two elements have the same value for a feature, or one of them 
does not have the feature. Agreement follows from the Coherence Condition. In 
the case of subject–tense agreement, these elements are related in order to 
                                                
    22 I define the condition in terms of coindexation because this is the most frequent means used 
to express the relation between two coreferential/agreeing elements. But this formalism is 
not crucial: It could be any other procedure with formally similar effects such as an arc in a 
general graph. The relation is of the type Saussure calls rapports associatifs, which are 
mediated by a paradigm and the link between the two terms is established in absentia.  
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mediate the relation between the ontologically different event and Tense, as 
mentioned above. This is what triggers agreement between subject and Tense 
(Bouchard 1995: 226–227). This agreement does not depend on a structural 
configuration, but is due to the lexical specifications that determine which actant 
of the event mediates the link between the event and a point in time, i.e. between 
the ISSUE and Tense.23 
 
 
6. Conclusion: The UG Problem Solved 
 
A learner exposed to the pair of sentences in (1) is not driven to choose between 
various movement rules because what is going on in polar interrogatives in 
English is not that words or phrases are moving around. Instead, deictic Tense is 
being combined from outside with the ISSUE-constituent. This relation is 
different from the one in declaratives and results in the illocutionary force of a 
polar interrogative. There is no reason why children would make errors as in 
(2c), (4b), (6c), (8c–d), (9b–c), or (11) by analogy, since this is not at all analogous 
to what they are doing. Children learn that a sentence is anchored deictically, 
they learn which of Tense or Person or Place is the deictic anchoring in their 
language, and they learn that this deictic anchoring can result in a declarative 
meaning. Children also learn how the deictic anchor is inserted with respect to 
the rest of a sentence to express that declarative meaning in their language, that 
is, they learn a sign — what form (signifiant) their language uses to express the 
declarative meaning (signifié). They also know that a different form corresponds 
to a different meaning: In the case at hand, they learn that a particular order of 
combination of the deictic anchor, or a marker on it such as –tu or ni–, or an 
intonation on the sentence, corresponds to a polar interrogative meaning. These 
are important aspects of the data provided by the interfaces. The Primary 
Linguistic Data is saturated with information germane to acquiring what is really 
going on in questions like (1b). 
 Given the actual richness of the PLD about the relevant properties, nativist 
speculations about a geno-typically specified UG are patently otiose. The canali-
zation of language acquisition is not done by contingent UG constraints on the 
functioning of the formal apparatus, but is due to the substantial properties of the 
linguistic signs. “Infants somehow select language-related data from the 
‘blooming buzzing confusion’ of the external world” (Berwick et al. 2011: 1208–
1209). In particular, they learn signs, both unitary signs (morphemes, words) and 
                                                
    23 Aissen (1989) discusses data that favor an account of agreement as a consequence of 
interpretation for Tense agreement. She gives examples from several languages where Tense 
does not agree with the subject, but rather with the combination of the subject and a 
comitative. Since phrases in two different, non-coordinated positions agree with Tense, 
there is no direct way to account for this kind of agreement in a structural analysis. On the 
other hand, if agreement is a consequence of interpretation, one simply has to assume that 
the index of both the subject and the comitative determine verbal agreement in these 
languages, as in other cases of multiple antecedents such as (20b). 
   The analysis of agreement as a consequence of the Coherence Condition also gets 
support from sylleptic agreement (agreement based on meaning instead of form), to which it 
extends naturally, as shown in Bouchard (1995: sect. 3.3.2.4). 
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combinatorial signs (forms such as juxtaposition in a particular order or mark-
ings on heads or dependents, or particular intonations, all of which can be linked 
to particular meanings such as argumenthood, adjuncthood, polar interrogative; 
see Bouchard 1996, 2002). This is the logical minimum: it is necessary, and suffici-
ent to generalize from the data they are exposed to. 
 Question formation in English is a meaning-dependent insertion of Tense 
in a particular position, and not the result of a syntactic operation moving things 
around. This is revealed by the fact that a POS argument based on movement 
rules in these sentences fails in the wildest cases, even when it is backed by 
structure dependence and several other constraints attributed to UG. That proce-
dure can pair sounds with more interpretations than competent speakers permit, 
as well as pair the polar interrogative interpretation with more sounds than 
competent speakers permit. Structure dependence is noise in the experiment due 
to a faulty experimental method, chiefly, the assumption of natural positions of 
interpretation and movement. The noise is so intense that its users fail to see that 
the method does not account for even the wildest cases, and they fail to discuss 
why those combinations of forms are attributed the meaning of polar inter-
rogative. This is similar to a situation where someone would discuss the pair of 
sentences John saw Mary and Mary saw John without mentioning how the differ-
ence in the way the words combine corresponds to a difference in interpretation. 
They ignore this most elementary property of the sentences and just try to de-
scribe what goes where linearly and hierarchically. Some 50-plus years after 
examples like (1) were initially offered, why Tense ends up in Comp remains a 
total mystery in this approach. 
 Transformationalists think about question formation as potentially linear as 
in the errors in (2c), (4b), (6c), (8c–d), (9b–c), or (11) because the vision of their 
theory allows it: Linear systems are part of the set of possible formal systems 
among which they are trying to find the subset that generates human languages. 
So it is one option that they must rule out by a language-specific constraint in 
UG, like structure dependence. But errors as in (2c), (4b), (6c), (8c–d), (9b–c), or 
(11) are actually ruled out by a principled reason: In these ungrammatical cases, 
either there is no sign like a special order changing the relation of Tense with the 
ISSUE, or no particle marking the sentence with semantics relevant to polar inter-
rogatives, or the semantics resulting from the combination of the elements in that 
order is uninterpretable. 
 Over the years, there has been a lot of swapping of one theoretical device 
for another with similar effects, for example, from a rule that explicitly moves 
AUX across the subject to a feature that attracts the tensed V to Comp, from 
cycles to phases, and so on. These shuffles do not improve overall UG stipu-
lations. Hauser et al. (2002) propose a divide between the faculty of language in 
the broad sense (FLB) and in the narrow sense (FLN) in an attempt to reduce the 
content of UG (i.e. FLN). Many mechanisms of FLB are present among non-
human animals, and in non-linguistic activities in humans. “That is not the case, 
though, of FLN, which is something like a residue of the uniquely human nature 
of the language faculty, which, by definition, cannot be compared to anything 
existing in the mind of other species (nor even in other domains of the human 
mind)” (Boeckx & Longa 2011: 265). If this residue UG/FLN was extremely 
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limited, we would be approaching the ‘strong minimalist hypothesis’. However, 
despite the expressed intent to eliminate UG — this repertoire of the unexplained 
elements of S0, current generative models still appeal to several of these elements 
in their actual analyses. Here is an illustrative sample taken mostly from Horn-
stein & Boeckx (2009) and Narita & Fujita (2010): 
 
• constituency; 
• endocentricity labeling; 
• c-command; 
• functional categories that proliferate in cartography; 
• parameters (intractable number of micro or macro) distributed over 
different modules of FL; 
• bind and binding conditions; 
• displacement; 
• uninterpretable features and specifications about which elements they may 
attach to and when; 
• agreement; 
• cycle/phase bounding nodes; 
• Phase Impenetrability; 
• Transfer; 
• locality conditions (Ross’s Problem: why does locality hold for move but 
not pronominalization?) 
• condition on theta assignment: arguments must be initially merged in 
theta-positions; 
• Numeration: once a NUM is exhausted, a new NUM can be selected to 
extend it cyclically (Uriagereka (2002: 7); 
• Linearize: there has to be a procedure Linearize, with something like the 
LCA to constrain it. 
 
The goal of eliminating the unexplained elements listed in UG will remain a very 
unfinished business as long as the emphasis is on computational tools and the 
facts are seen as resulting from the application of these tools. Because it still 
constantly resorts to dumping unexplained elements into UG, generative 
grammar uningenuously exposes the inadequacy of many of its claimed 
explanations of linguistic facts. 
 Given the epistemological problems that the concept of UG raises, there 
should be very strong empirical reasons to resort to it. One main source is the 
logical problem of language acquisition. But Plato’s problem is not insurmount-
able in the case of language. We know so much because the evidence we have is 
very informative about signs and how they combine. Contra Fodor (2001), 
children do not need a dedicated Learning Machine like UG to figure out what 
grammar/syntax underlies the language they are exposed to: Whatever Learning 
Machine enables them to learn signs also enables them to learn combinatorial 
signs such as dedicated orders of signs. 
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 Foregoing UG does not mean that every possible option is admitted and 
that languages can vary infinitely. There are factors other than language-specific 
UG conditions that canalize grammar very stringently. Language being a system 
that links concepts and percepts, it is shaped by constraints from the CI and SM 
systems that predate it and thus are not specific to it. In any model, the logically 
prior properties of the perceptual and conceptual systems necessarily impose 
boundaries within which a child charts a highly circumscribed course in 
language development. I make the parsimonious hypothesis that these properties 
are sufficient and are the only canalization elements of language. We have seen 
how this works in circumscribing question formation: this kind of system covers 
the full range of examples just discussed, adequately capturing what knowledge 
speakers acquire, while minimizing any posited language-specific innate 
endowment. SM and CI factors also account for the restrictions on other well-
known constructions that have been used to argue for POS and UG. See for 
instance the account of classical islands in Bouchard (1984, 2002: 348–358), as well 
as the seminal work of Erteschik-Shir (1973), and the scopal analysis in Szabolcsi 
& den Dikken (1999) and Szabolcsi (2002); the account of binding conditions 
suggested in Bouchard (2006) and developed in Bouchard (in progress); the way 
the meaning of Negative Polarity Items accounts for the restrictions on their dis-
tribution without appealing to UG constraints, as shown in Giannakidou (2001). 
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